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Available online 3 December 2013This paper explores a multi-model scenario ensemble to assess the impacts of idealized and
non-idealized climate change stabilization policies on fossil fuel markets. Under idealized
conditions climate policies significantly reduce coal use in the short- and long-term. Reductions in
oil and gas use are much smaller, particularly until 2030, but revenues decrease much more
because oil and gas prices are higher than coal prices. A first deviation from optimal transition
pathways is delayed action that relaxes global emission targets until 2030 in accordancewith the
Copenhagen pledges. Fossil fuel markets revert back to the no-policy case: though coal use
increases strongest, revenue gains are higher for oil and gas. To balance the carbon budget over
the 21st century, the long-term reallocation of fossil fuels is significantly larger—twice andmore—
than the short-term distortion. This amplifying effect results from coal lock-in and inter-fuel
substitution effects to balance the full-century carbon budget. The second deviation from the
optimal transition pathway relaxes the global participation assumption. The result here is less
clear-cut across models, as we find carbon leakage effects ranging from positive to negative
because trade and substitution patterns of coal, oil, and gas differ across models. In summary,
distortions of fossil fuel markets resulting from relaxed short-term global emission targets are
more important and less uncertain than the issue of carbon leakage from early mover action.
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Climate change and fossil fuel markets are interrelated. The
use of fossil fuels contributes to the lion's share of greenhousePotsdam, Germany.
uer).
Authors. Published by Elsegases (GHG) emissions, in particular CO2 [1]. Correspondingly,
efforts to abate GHG emissions to mitigate climate change will
likely affect global fossil fuel markets [2]. The response of fossil
fuel markets to mitigation efforts will have an important
influence on the costs and acceptability of abatement options
[3]. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
highlighted this crucial relationship some years ago [4,5].vier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC-BY license
Table 1
Description of scenarios developed in the two modeling set-ups of the paper.
Modeling set-up Scenario description Acronym in figures
(1) Global timing of mitigation Baseline without restrictions on emissions NoPol
Stabilization with full ‘when’-flexibility 550-e and 450-e
Stabilization with low global emission target until 2030; 44.2GtCO2/yr
in 2030 for fossil fuel and industry only and 46.6GtCO2/yr if land-use
change emissions are included
550-Lo and 450-Lo
Stabilization with high global emission target until 2030 37.3GtCO2/yr
in 2030 for fossil fuel and industry only and 39.3GtCO2/yr if land-use
change emissions are included
550-Hi and 450-Hi
(2) Fragmented participation Fragmented policy baseline implementing regional Copenhagen pledges
by regional carbon taxes
FragPol
EU implements Road-Map on top of fragmented policy baseline EU Road-Map
EU and China implement uniform carbon tax from 450 ppm-e case on
top of fragmented policy baseline
EU&CHN tax
1 [17] summarizes the results of the EMF29 model comparison study on
carbon leakage.
2 Production and goods trade are re-allocated so that an emission-constrained
countries import goods with high carbon content, which offsets some of the
domestic emission reductions. It is also known as competitiveness channel.
3 Industries relocate from emission-constrained countries to unconstrained
countries and therefore part of the emission reduction effort is offset.
4 [19] relies on a single model framework and, hence, is different in nature
to [17].
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state-of-the-art energy and integrated assessment models has
improved considerably. Based on these advances, this paper
seeks to assess the potential effects on fossil fuel markets
induced by climate mitigation policies. A multi-model
framework is used to understand these effects.
Policies aimed at long-term climate change stabilization are
currently being debated in the political and scientific arena.
Research so far focused on cost-optimal scenarios that are
implemented by idealized policies—i.e., if no constraints
on countries' participation andon the timingof action are imposed
so that both ‘when’- and ‘where’-flexibility of emission reductions
can be exploited to the largest degree. The international political
process, however, has to date failed to negotiate a global,
long-term climate change mitigation agreement. Therefore, more
recent scenario studies, such as the AMPERE project, analyze
deviations from idealized policies. In this context, the present
study looks at the implications for fossil fuel markets.
The first deviation from idealized policy scenarios
considers global, short-term emission targets derived by
current voluntary pledges on the part of individual countries (see
Table1 for ageneraldescription).Westudy the implicationsof these
short-term targets for achieving long-term levels of climate change
stabilization, e.g., the 2 °C target. The dilemma we attempt to
approximate with this model set-up is on the one hand the
Copenhagen Accord that mentions the 2 °C target as a long-term
stabilizationobjective, andontheotherhandtheshort-termpledges
actually agreed upon within the Copenhagen Accord (and later
re-confirmed in the Cancun Agreement) that appear less ambitious
and could make it difficult—if not impossible—to achieve the
long-term target. There exist considerable uncertainties regarding
the interpretation of some of these pledges (e.g. [6]). Therefore, in
this study we include two alternative short-term emission
trajectories until 2030 based on two distinct interpretations of the
Copenhagen pledges about global near-term emissions: one high
trajectory and one low trajectory, which reflect the uncertainty
related to the formulation of the pledges. We analyze the
implications of these short-term targets on long-term (until 2100)
stabilization goals in the form of a stringent 450 ppm CO2-eq and a
less stringent 550 ppm CO2-eq stabilization target.
The set-up of our experiment extends the scientific
literature looking at the timing of carbon emissions and the
resulting mitigation costs [7–12]. However, in contrast to this
literature, we develop scenarios that are more in line with
real-world policies, and we focus on the inter-temporalre-allocation of fossil fuel use and the resulting impact on fossil
fuel revenues. The analysis focuses on the heterogeneity of
fossil fuel uses and the inertia of energy sector infrastructure.
These key factors determine fossil fuelmarket outcomes,which
are interrelated in a complex way with the intertemporal
re-allocation of carbon emissions that are consistent with the
carbon budget. Other papers have looked at the fossil fuel
markets implications of climate policy. For instance, [13,14]
study fossil fuel use in idealized long-termstabilization scenarios,
and [14] also tests the sensitivity of fossil fuel availability and
changes of fossil fuel rents. Yet, none of these papers looks into
short- and long-term implications of deviations from idealized
‘when’-flexibility or the effect of more “realistic” policies.
The seconddeviation from idealized policies included in our
scenario set-up (see Table 1) focuses on the effectiveness of
early and unilateral mitigation policies in a fragmented climate
policy world and assesses carbon leakage effects (for a broader
overview see [15]). As a reference scenario we choose a world
with fragmented emission mitigation policies. Because the
focus shifts to the regional impacts of polices for this second
part, we adopt country-specific Copenhagen pledges as well as
specific technology policies. We then consider alterations of
this reference case by assumingmore stringent climate policies
are undertaken in the EU and, in some of the scenarios, in China
aswell.We analyze the leakage and substitution of coal, oil and
gas to explain the large range of carbon leakage.
Carbon leakage is frequently discussed because it has the
potential to undermine the environmental effectiveness of
unilateral climate policies. [5,16,17]1 argue that the ‘industry
channel’2 and ‘pollution haven’ effects3 are the main drivers
of high carbon leakage effects. [18,19]4 highlight the
relatively high importance of the energy market effects that
work through re-allocation in fossil energy markets. A series
of papers recently published in the American Economic Review
highlight the scarcity of capital being a fixed factor as a
potential reason for negative carbon leakage [20–22]. The
5 The global improvement rate of ﬁnal energy intensity is assumed at
~1.3%/yr. This leads to a range of 655–725 EJ/yr in 2050 and 910–1000 EJ/yr
in 2100.
6 The carbon budgets 2000–2100 are differentiated depending on the
speciﬁc model (i) runs until 2050 or 2100 and (ii) includes the land use
sector emissions. For long-term models the carbon budget is 1500 GtCO2
with and 1400 GtCO2 without emissions from the land-use sector. For
models only focusing on the time horizon up to 2050 the budget is
1300 GtCO2.
7 For models applying intertemporal optimization for deriving the carbon
emission path ‘when’ ﬂexibility is related to the optimal timing of emission
mitigation. Some recursive dynamic models (GCAM) assume exponentially
increasing carbon taxes that reconcile the optimality conditions of the
Hotelling model. Other recursive dynamic models (IMACLIM, IMAGE) do not
assume exponentially increasing carbon taxes. In IMAGE the carbon tax path
is determined by a cost minimization based on a large number of runs. There
is, however, no algorithm applied to determine this price path but is
determined by the model teams. The IMACLIM model adjusts the carbon
emission path. The overview paper by Kriegler et al. [15] discusses this issue
in more detail.
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goes beyond previous contributions in four respects. First, it
uses a suite of integrated assessment models, thus enabling
us to find results robust to a series of assumptions and
modeling paradigms. Second, most of the models used here
represent the energy sector in a bottom-up way and therefore
capture the heterogeneity on a detailed techno-economic level
rather than a parameterizedmacro-economic level. Exceptions
are the computable general equilibrium models GEM-E3 and
WorldScan2. We highlight that fossil fuel leakage implies
inter-fuel substitution in non-abating countries, which dampens
carbon leakage and can even turn it negative. The argument is a
novelty in the literature and occurs if reduced gas and oil
consumption leaks via international markets to non-abating
countries, where it then substitutes coal consumption, which in
turn reduces CO2 emissions in non-abating countries. Third, all
models are dynamic considering gradual changes over time.
Finally, the present scenario framework considers strong
unilateral emission reduction policies in a few countries in
combination with weak policy ambition in other countries. A
further unique aspect of the present study is that eleven different
models assume harmonized baseline assumptions (population,
final energy demand, GDP) and standardized policy assumptions.
Together the models cover a broad diversity of modeling
approaches and parameterizations, which makes it possible to
explore uncertainties without relying on only a single model.
This model diversity is an advantage for the present study
because real-world fossil fuel markets are characterized by
heterogeneity and inertia. Coal, oil and gas differ in regional
availability, carbon intensity, prices, conversion technologies,
transportation costs, etc. Coal, oil and gas can substitute each
other only in certain applications. Moreover, some applica-
tions of coal and gas are amenable to carbon capture and
sequestration (CCS) to supply low-carbon energy. Finally, fossil
fuel related infrastructure is inert. For all of these reasons,
the models' representations of fossil fuel markets are very
different and, thus, the resulting scenarios often strongly differ.
Utilization of a multi-model ensemble helps to understand the
key differences and, by extension, to assess the uncertainties of
climate change mitigation policies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 gives an overview of general model features.
Section 3 presents results for emissions and fossil fuel use for
a no-policy baseline and two stabilization targets under
idealized policy assumptions. Section 4 studies the deviations
from the assumption of full ‘when’-flexibility, and Section 5
addresses the leakage issue in a fragmented policy regime.
Section 6 summarizes and discusses the key findings of this
study. This paper comes with Supporting Online Material.
2. Methods
The models participating in this study are all known in the
scientific literature, as they have previously been used in the
assessment of climate change mitigation policies. All are global,
long-term models and comprise a detailed energy sector
representation including fossil fuel trade. In addition, all
differentiate coal, oil and gas markets and include the option
of carbon capture and sequestration. The main differences
relevant for the present study (summarized in Table 2) relate to
the models' solution structures, with recursive dynamic (RD)models solving a sequence of equilibria and fully inter-temporal
(IT)models having perfect foresight. Furthermore, most models
assume optimal emission timing either by the IT feature or
because a Hotelling-type carbon price path is implemented to
comply with a carbon budget. Early retirement of existing
infrastructure (like coal power plants) is also a feature included
in a sub-set of models. Some models not only account for CO2
emissions from fossil fuel and industry (FFI), but also consider
land-use change (LUC) carbon emissions from the land-use
sector. Finally, models differ in their fossil fuel price-formation
mechanisms (see Table S1 for details). It should be noted,
however, that not allmodels participated in all parts of the study.
3. Climate change stabilization with full ‘when’- and
‘where’-ﬂexibility
In this section we present the results for three scenarios that
(i) consider full availability of the technology portfolio and
(ii) assume harmonized development of final energy demand5
across models. The NoPol case assumes no policies for limiting
future GHG emissions. It serves as a counterfactual reference
scenario to evaluate the use of fossil fuels and the subsequent
mitigation effort needed to achieve climate change stabilization.
We focus on two stabilization scenarios here: the 550-e and
450-e, which implement carbon budgets6 constraining cumu-
lative emissions until 2100 that are consistent with GHG
concentrations of 550 ppm CO2-eq and 450 ppm CO2-eq,
respectively, at the end of the century. The stabilization scenarios
allow full ‘when’ and ‘where’ flexibility for carbon emission
paths.7 If models consider CO2 emissions from the land-use
sector, then inter-sectoral mitigation flexibility is allowed.
Fig. 1 shows two key results for the cumulative CO2
emissions. First, in the no-policy case (NoPol) near-term
(2011–2030) emissions are below 1000 GtCO2 whereas long-
term (2031–2100) emissions reach no less than 5500 GtCO2
and can even exceed 8000 GtCO2. Second, near-term reductions
are comparatively less than long-term reductions to achieve
the stabilization targets. Near-term reduction is 5–35% from
baseline in the 550-e case while it is up to 18%-points larger in
the 450-e case. The long-term reduction is 70–85% from
baseline in the 550-e case and 10–20%-points more in the
450-e case. In the longer term the land-use sector of some
models (MESSAGE, DNE21) realize negative emissions as this
Table 2
Overview of models participating in this study regarding emission timing and fragmented regimes.
DNE21+ GCAM GEM-E3 IMACLIM IMAGE MERGE-ETL MESSAGE POLES REMIND WITCH WorldScan2
Time horizon 2050 2100 2050 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2050
Land-use sector CO2 emissions ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪
‘when’-flexibility participation ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪
Dynamic structurea IT RD RD RD RD IT IT RD IT IT RD
Optimal emission timing ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪
Early retirement ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪
Fragmented policies participation
Scenario: EU acts ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪
Scenario: China and EU act ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪
a IT means inter-temporal, RD means recursive dynamic.
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increases the CO2 emissions due to deforestation for increased
bioenergy supply.
Fig. 2 shows the cumulative use of fossil fuels across the
different models over varying time frames, where the dark color
shadings indicate short-term consumption (2011–2030) and light
color shadings depict long-term consumption (2030–2011). The
hatched bars indicate the combinationwith CCS. In the absence of
emissions limits (NoPol), the short-termcumulative useof oil until
2030 is around 4.1ZJ (−0.3; +0.9). Also for natural gas the
short-termbaselines roughlyagreearound2.8 ZJ (−0.4;+0.7). The
short-term differences in cumulative coal use are more uncertain,
however, with a range of 3.3 to 6 ZJ around amedian of 3.9ZJ.
The NoPol baseline scenarios generally disagree regarding
the structure of fossil fuel use in the longer term (indicated by
the light color shading). The highest long-term cumulative use ofFig. 1. Cumulative global CO2 emissions and fossil fuel use differentiated between sh
LUC indicates those from land-use change.oil is computed by the WITCH and MESSAGE models, whereas
the REMIND baseline scenario shows the highest gas use. Two
models (IMACLIM and MERGE-ETL) make more conservative
assumptions about oil and gas availability; hence, the most
economical alternative in these cases is the large scale use of
relatively cheap coal. In both models, this in turn increases total
fossil fuel use and boosts CO2 emissions because final energy
demand is supplied by a relatively inefficient and
carbon-intensive energy sector. This explains the relatively high
CO2 emissions of both models previously shown in Fig. 1. These
results indicate that in the long run limited availability of oil and
gas is substituted by higher coal use, implying higher CO2
emissions if no carbon emission limitations are imposed.
Imposing climate change stabilization targets leads to
competition between coal, oil and gas use for the disposal
space of carbon in the atmosphere (these cases are alsoort and long term. FFI means CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry and
Fig. 2. Cumulative global fossil fuel use in the no policy reference case and two stabilization scenarios with full ‘when’ and ‘where’-flexibility. Hatched bars indicate
fossil fuel use in combination with CCS. The bars on the right compare themedians of cumulative global fossil fuel use 2011–2100 in the scenarios with assessments of
fossil fuel availability. Data taken from [23]. Note: the order of extraction in the models does not necessarily coincide with the stack order of the bars.
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to drastic reductions in the demand for coal, oil and gas over
the entire 21st century, though the short-run picture is quite
diverse. Compared to the baseline, cumulative coal use until
2030 is reduced by 24%, ranging between 10 and 55% for the
550-e target; this reduction is more significant for the 450-e
target with amedian of 41% (13–56%). Oil use drops by only 4%
(0–15%) for the 550-e target and is still as small as 6% (0–17%)
for the 450-e case. The changes in gas use are ambiguous: it can
decrease by 11% or increase up to 26% in the 550-e case,with an
even higher uncertainty (−28% to +27%) in the stricter 450-e
case, whereas the median shows only a slight reduction for
both targets. The combination of fossil fuels with CCS is
relatively small until 2030. Gas with CCS reaches a cumulative
maximum of 130 EJ (DNE21+ in 450-e) and coal with CCS is
never higher than 400 EJ (POLES in 550-e).
Long-term fossil fuel use is drastically reduced by climate
stabilization policies. The median of total fossil fuel use is
45 ZJ in the 550-e case and still 35 ZJ in the 450-e case. The
lowest levels are reported by the WITCH model (35 ZJ for
550-e and 24 ZJ for 450-e). Models that rely more on CCS
show higher fossil fuel use. Most coal is used in combination
with CCS, and the use of this technology option is generally
higher in the 550-e than in the 450-e case because of the
relatively high residual emissions that are not captured. Gas
with CCS is also used to a considerable degree. In contrast
to coal, this technology is used at a larger scale in the 450-e
than in the 550-e case. Interesting to note: some models
(MERGE-ETL, IMAGE, IMACLIM) achieve the 450-e targetwith higher cumulative coal than oil use, whereas other
models strongly reduce coal after 2030 (e.g. REMIND).
Finally, we compare the ensemblemedian cumulative fossil
fuel consumption over the 21st century with fossil fuel
endowments (right part of Fig. 2). The use of fossil fuels in
baseline scenarios exceeds overall conventional reserves.
While gas use does not exhaust the total reserve, coal reserves
are not sufficient to supply the growing demand. Oil use would
even be higher than the entire reserves and conventional
resources. In stabilization scenarios much of the coal reserve
would be left underground, but oil and gas consumption is still
higher than the conventional reserves. Oil use in the 450-e case
would even be nearly as high as the known reserves of oil.
4. Long-term climate change stabilization with
restricted ‘when’-ﬂexibility
In this section we analyze the effect of combining the two
long-term stabilization targets with two short-term emission
constraints. Prescribing short-term emission pathways until
2030 constrains the ‘when’-flexibility, since the long-term
emission budget has to be met. We apply a high and a low
short-term emission constraint denoted HST and LST, respec-
tively. The HST requires 2030 carbon emissions to stay below
44.2 GtCO2/yr if only fossil fuel and industry emissions are
considered, and below 46.6 GtCO2/yr if also land-use emissions
are represented in the model. For the LST cases the corre-
sponding values are 37.3 and 39.3 GtCO2/yr, respectively. These
emission targets are below the baseline emission pathways of all
248 N. Bauer et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 243–256models but typically exceed the 2030 levels of the optimal
transition pathways, 550-e and 450-e (see Fig. 1)—though for
some models they are lower. In the following discussion we
generally refer to the case where short-term targets lead to
emissions in 2030 that are higher than the optimal transition
pathways; otherwise it is indicated explicitly. The imposition of
short-term emission targets could in certain instances render it
impossible to achieve the stabilization targets. These scenarios
are interpreted to be non-solvable and are highlighted in
the following graphs; they are not part of the analysis, however.
[24,25] derive the short-term emission targets and provide a
detailed analysis of time paths of individualmodels; wewill only
focus on cumulative short- and long-term emissions.
Figure S1 of the supporting online material shows the
dynamic re-allocation of CO2 emissions across models and
scenarios. The total dynamic re-allocation of carbon emis-
sions in the 550-e case can exceed 100 GtCO2, but is less than
5% of the total emission budget for the full century. In the
450-e case the figure is as high as 230 GtCO2, which amounts
to 15% of the more stringent budget. If short-term targets
lead to excess emissions, scenarios that also represent land-
use emissions show that these additional land-use emissions
(short and long-term) trade off with long-term emissions
from fossil-fuel and industry. Hence, short-term limitations on
‘when’-flexibility have an inter-sectoral effect that requires
stronger emission reductions from fossil fuels and industry to
comply with a long-term carbon budget.4.1. Constrained ‘when’-ﬂexibility and fossil fuel use
In this sub-section we analyze the implication of the
dynamic re-allocation of the carbon emission budget on the
allocation of fossil fuels. We calculate the differences between
the stabilization cases with full ‘when’-flexibility and the case
with short-term emission targets.We do this separately for the
short- and the long-term period to measure the dynamic
reallocation. We also differentiate between coal, oil and gas as
well as with and without CCS. Therefore we also capture the
inter-fuel dimension of the reallocation.
Fig. 3 shows the dynamic re-allocation of global coal, oil and
gas use. A robust finding is that under short-term emission
targets the strongest short-term increase is found for coal. This
result is not a surprise: if near termemission targets are relaxed
towards the no-policy baseline emissions, the reversal of
absolute coal use back to the baseline is stronger than the
reversal of oil or gas. Only the models WITCH and POLES show
significant short-term reversal of oil and gas use whereas
REMIND, DNE21+, and MERGE-ETL do not show this effect.
The latter set of models mostly reduces near-term coal use to
achieve the stabilization targets (see Fig. 2). With relaxed
emission targets Fig. 3 also shows that coal and gas use with
CCS is reduced, but the effect is relatively small because its
short-term diffusion is rather limited.
The short-term emission cap induces a distortion from the
solution that makes full use of ‘when’-flexibility. A robust
result for all models8 and scenarios is that the longer-term8 The model DNE21+ does not meet the requirement to reallocate the
budget between short- and long-term at equal shares. See Fig. 3. Therefore,
the ampliﬁcation ratio can fall below 1.reallocation of fossil energy to balance the carbon budget is
larger than the short term distortion. This can be observed from
the fact that the sum of long-term components (light colors) is
larger than the short-term components (dark colors). Four main
effects help to explain the long/short-term amplification shown
in Fig. 3. These effects are at work to different degrees in the
various scenarios and models.
1. Carbon-intensity and CCS effect: We noted above that
the higher short-term use of coal is the largest effect. This
is balanced by long-term reductions of oil and gas. Since oil
and gas have lower carbon intensities, the corresponding
reduction in energy units must be larger. This can be
observed, for example, in the WITCH model. In a
considerable number of scenarios, the dynamic carbon
emission compensation is achieved by a reduction of oil
consumption. The carbon intensity effect leads to lower total
oil consumption over the 21st century in 17 out of 26
relevant scenarios. The CCS effect is a specific variant of the
carbon intensity effect. The residual emissions of CCS plants
are still using up the carbon budget because the carbon
capture rate is below 100%. If compliance with the carbon
budget requires reducing long-run use of CCS, the fossil fuel
reduction in energy units needs be much larger than the
higher use fossil fuels without CCS to balance the carbon
budget. The higher the capture rate of the originally applied
technologies (e.g. in power plants), the higher must be the
total reduction for long-term emission compensation
because only the residual emissions are accounted to
balance the emission budget. The effect can lead to a total
reduction in the use of coal (POLES, MESSAGE) or gas
(REMIND). Also some models (REMIND, WITCH, DNE21+)
are constrained by the CCS capacity and as bio-energy with
CCS increases to meet the carbon budget, the use of fossil
fuels with CCS decreases (see Figure S2).
2. Coal lock-in effect: Higher near-term use of coal also tends
to continue after 2030 and implies higher cumulative
long-term coal use (positive light blue component). This is
due to a lock-in of coal-fuelled infrastructure that keeps on
operating because early retirement is not assumed or
constrained.9 Generally this effect is even larger for the
stricter stabilization target, because the forgone emission
reduction due to the short-term emission target is even
larger in the 450-e case. This effect is at work in nearly all
models and scenarios. This crucial feature is different in
the WITCH model that assumes full flexibility of early
retirement and, thus, can put more quickly a break on coal
use to avoid the lock-in, which is indicated by the light blue
bar being placed on the left part of Fig. 3.
3. Inter-fuel substitution effect: The long-term use of coal is
strongly reduced and partially substituted by higher use of
oil and/or gas. For instance, POLES solves the short-term
distortion in the two 550-e cases by inducing inter-fuel
substitution in the long-term.
4. Intersectoral re-allocation effect: As noted above, CO2
emissions from fossil fuels and industry trade-off with
land-use emissions. Higher near-term land-use emissions9 [22] show the exact extent of early retirement of coal capacities in all
models and different scenarios.
10 This means the US$ prices deﬂated to the year 2005.
Fig. 3. Changes of global fossil fuel use of cases with constrained ‘when’-flexibility compared with respect to the first best solution shown in Fig. 2. Hatched bars
indicate fossil fuel use in combination with CCS. Non-solvable scenarios are marked by black diamonds. In case the short-term emission target is higher than the
emissions with full ‘when’-flexibility the scenario is indicated by bold fond (taken from Figure S1). Note that positive and negative components of each scenario
do not necessarily add up to zero. The amplification ratio is given on the right side of the plot. It is defined as the sum of absolute values of long-term components
put into relation with the sum of the positive short-term components.
249N. Bauer et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 243–256are compensated by lower fossil fuel and industry emissions
in the longer-term.
The strength of the amplification effect can be measured by
the amplification ratio. The sum of absolute values of long-term
components is put into relation with the sum of the positive
short-term components. The values are reported on the far right
of Fig. 3, if the short-term distortion exceeds 500 EJ. The carbon
intensity effect seems relatively small. WITCH mainly relies on
the long-term reduction of oil and gas to compensate for higher
near-termcoal use implying a relatively small amplification ratio.
The carbon lock-in effect amplifies the initial distortion more
effectively. REMIND and MERGE-ETL show amplification ratios
above two. The various amplification effects are, however, not
independent. For instance, the coal lock-in effect amplifies the
carbon intensity and the CCS effect, but the carbon intensity
effect dampens the inter-fuel substitution effect.
The various models deal differently with the dynamic
trade-off to comply with the long-term carbon budgets. Some
models show characteristic reallocation patterns across
scenarios; theymainly differ regarding the scales of the various
components. Such a model-specific reallocation pattern is
shown for the WITCH scenarios, where the initially higher use
of coal is reduced by stronger reductions of oil and gas. In
REMIND also the significant coal lock-in effect needs to be
balance, which is partially achieved by less use of gas with CCS.
AIM-Enduse also reduces the long-term use of coal without
CCS. POLES relies on long-term inter-fuel substitution in the
550-e cases. In the two 450-e cases, however, the reaction issimilar to REMIND. Here, the influence of the long-term
stabilization target dominates the differences between the
short-term emission targets. Also in MERGE-ETL the two 450-e
cases show a robust pattern (similar to REMIND), whereas the
550-e HST case shows some inter-fuel substitution effect.
IMACLIM scenarios show different patterns making use of
various reallocation options. The re-allocation of fossil fuels
regarding CCS fueled plants leads to high amplification ratios.4.2. Fossil fuel revenue effects
The change in the net present value of fossil fuel revenues is
used to assess the economic impact of climate change
stabilization with and without ‘when’-flexibility. Revenues
are computed by weighting fossil fuel consumption per period
with the then current prices10 to be paid by demand sectors.
Alternatively, profits or rents could be used as an indicator to
assess the wealth of fossil fuel owners [14]. Revenues also
include the costs of extracting and transporting the fossil fuels
(i.e. the factor incomes for labor, equipment, services, etc.), and
therefore reflect the situation of the entire sector. Additionally,
some models consider resource taxes and royalties. Fossil fuel
prices vary significantly across models (see Figure S3) but are
within the range of historical fossil fuel prices, which differed
significantly over last two decades [26]. This range is due to
different modeling approaches for the price formation
Fig. 4. Net present value of cumulative revenues 2011–2100 of fossil fuels in scenarios with full when flexibility. The net present value is for the year 2011 applying a
discount rate of 5% per year. The numbers on the right to the graph represent the fossil fuel share of GDP 2011–30 and 2031–2100, also based on net present values.
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feature is shared by all models: carbon prices affect the market
prices of fossil fuels, but the emission penalty from emitting
CO2 after combustion is excluded. The emission penalty is paid
by down-stream sectors depending on their emissions.
Fig. 4 shows fossil fuel revenues for the no-policy baseline
and the two stabilization scenarios with full ‘when’-flexibility.
The model uncertainty exceeds the uncertainty of climate
policies because fossil fuel prices vary significantly across
models. Oil revenues account for most of the diversity because
oil prices are higher than gas and coal prices and oil prices vary
most across models. Revenue in the no-policy baseline ranges
from 42 tril.US$ for GCAM to 135 tril.US$ for POLES. Most
models with high revenues in the baseline also show large
reductions in the stabilization cases.11 For instance, for the
POLES model the total revenue in the 450-e case is halved to
67 tril.US$, whereas it is only slightly reduced (by 12%) to
37 tril.US$ in the GCAM model. Although the uncertainty
across models is considerable, a number of robust patterns
regarding the fossil fuel share of GDP emerge; shown on the
right of the plot. Firstly, fossil fuel shares decrease over time.
This means that the growth rate of GDP outpaces the growth
rate of fossil fuel revenues.12 Second, shares decrease with the
stringency of the climate change mitigation.11 The model DNE21+ is an exception, because it calibrates paremeters to
match the relatively high prices currently observed in the market. The initial
calibration of prices means that the reasons behind the prices are not
represented explicitly and therefore climate policies do not have a strong
effect on these prices.
12 Exceptions are POLES and REMIND, which show slightly increasing fossil
shares in the NoPol scenario.Next, we analyze the change in fossil fuel revenues due to
constraints on ‘when’-flexibility. For the analysis we take the
long-term stabilization target as given and examine the
short- and long-term revenue effects of choosing the high or
low short-term emission target. Fig. 5 shows the results for
the differences in revenues in a similar way like in Fig. 3.
Short-term fossil revenues increase if near-term carbon
emissions are higher because fossil fuel markets revert back to
the baseline scenario: generally, more fossil fuels are sold at
higher prices and, hence, revenues increase. Coal revenues
increase only slightly, though the quantity effect in energy
units is the most significant (as can be seen in Fig. 3). The
models with high fossil revenues in the baseline (WITCH,
POLES, IMACLIM) also have the highest short-term revenue
gains,mainly fromoil and gas. Thesemodels have high baseline
oil prices. With full ‘when’-flexibility, these prices would
decrease significantly. With higher near-term emission
targets, they revert back to the baseline. In REMIND the coal
component is largest in the short-term; the oil revenue
increases also due to slight price increases. For MERGE-ETL
the coal and oil revenue components are roughly equal, but
oil consumption is even less with reduced ‘when’-flexibility,
and the oil price effect dominates. Hence, for most models in
the short-run oil and gas revenues increase more from relaxed
short-term emission targets than coal revenues, though
quantity effects lead to strong relative decrease of coal
revenues.
The short-term gains have to be compared with the
longer-term effects that are also shown in Fig. 5. The WITCH
model indicates that short-term revenue gains over-compensate
long-term losses in all scenarios and for each fossil fuel. The
13 In this section we use the scenarios computed within work-package 3 of
the AMPERE project. Here, the GDP assumptions were harmonized to meet
similar economic development levels. Hence, GHG intensity improvements
lead to similar—though not equal—emission limitation trajectories.
14 In case of strict quantity targets the effects of carbon leakage would be
simply excluded because it would not allow the possibility that CO2
emissions go above the levels of the reference policy case.
Fig. 5. Differences of net present value of cumulative fossil fuel revenues compared with corresponding first best case assuming the same stabilization target. The
net present value is for the year 2011 applying a 5% discount rate per year. Non-solvable scenarios are marked by black diamonds.
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losses exceed short-term gains, especially for oil and gas. In this
model the coal lock-in effect requires strong long-term
reductions of oil and gas use. For the 550-e cases, the losses
also exceed the gains in the POLES model, though the carbon
budget is balanced by inter-fuel substitution towards oil and gas.
Here, lower prices reduce the revenuesmore than the higher use
increases them. In IMACLIM the comparison varies across cases.
MERGE-ETL shows an extreme reaction, since both oil and coal
increase in the 450-HST case. This is partly due to high penalties
on mining emissions. Additionally, coal revenues are higher due
to the coal lock-in effect and oil prices increase due to relative
scarcity effects.
A final note: Net present values are sensitive to discount
rates. The 5%/yr applied here is a low value compared to the
common practice used for investment decisions in the fossil
industry, but here we study the entire sector which justifies a
low discount rate. A higher discount rate—in the first place—
decreases the net present values of fossil fuel revenues. The
second order effect would imply a smaller relative weight on
longer-term revenue changes and therefore the results
would indicate a stronger preference for relaxed short-term
emission targets.
5. Carbon leakage in a world with fragmented
emission policies
The international aspects of fragmented climate change
mitigation policies are assessed by comparing the reference
policy case with two scenarios in which the EU and Chinastrengthen their policy ambition by increasing emission
mitigation. Carbon leakage through international fossil fuel
market re-allocation is one of the key risks of additional
uni-lateral and early action because it may undermine its
environmental effectiveness.
The reference policy case assumes a weak and fragmented
policy regime. The implementation of the reference policy case
is harmonized across models regarding proposed policies to
expand capacities of low-carbon technologies until 2020 as
well as carbon emission targets in 2020 based on regional
Copenhagen pledges and continued improvements of GHG
intensities of GDP13 thereafter. Given this setting each model
derives regional carbon prices that are consistent with the
emission targets. To assess the carbon leakage effect, the
modeling teams applied carbon prices instead of the quantity
targets14 for the two scenarios with additional policy
ambitions.
These scenarios assume specific measures by the EU and
China to achieve additional emission reductions:
1. EU-Road Map: The EU adopts the climate policy Road-Map
until 2030, whereas other regions adopt the pledges. The
EU-Road-Map requires stronger emission reductions than
252 N. Bauer et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 243–256the EU pledges. The implementation is harmonized across
models to achieve CO2 emission reduction targets. Some
models also applied the target to reduce the final energy
intensity of GDP by 20% until 2020.
2. EU and China carbon tax: The EU and China nationally
apply a uniform carbon tax with domestic revenue
recycling. The tax rates differ between models, but they
are consistently derived with each model by imposing a
long-term CO2 emission budget that is consistent with a
450 ppm-CO2 equivalent target.
We look specifically at leakage effects until 2030. A
longer duration of unilateral policies is not reasonable
because other regions would either join the mitigation
policies or early movers would drop their policies. We
focus on (i) the international fossil fuel leakage and (ii)
inter-fuel substitution in markets of early movers and other
regions.
Table 3 summarizes the carbon leakage effects for the two
scenarios and for each model. The cumulative emission
reduction through 2030 in the EU by applying the road map
is as high as 11.3 GtCO2. The emissions in the Rest-of-World
may increase by up to 2.3 GtCO2, but may also decrease
slightly, depending on the model. The resulting leakage rates
span a broad range and three out of eleven models compute
negative carbon leakage rates. This happens if reduced gas and
oil use in abating countries leaks via international markets to
non-abating countries, where it substitutes coal consumption
(see below for details). It must be noted that in all models,
including the inter-temporalmodels, the rest of theworld does
not expect future carbon pricing in the pre-2030 phase and
therefore there is no readjustment of their emissions path. This
simplification implies that the carbon leakage is at the upper
end.
The situation is different if the EU and China implement
the carbon tax. First, the combined emission reduction is
much larger compared to the case in which the EU acts alone.
And secondly, nomodel shows a notable leakage rate (b-1%).
There is no clear pattern how the leakage rates from one
model change between the two cases. One model
(MERGE-ETL) shows a high positive leakage rate in both
cases, whereas POLES shows always a small positive leakage.Table 3
Changes in cumulative emissions 2011—2030 in acting regions and the rest of the
changes in emissions in rest of the world relative to the changes in emissions in the a
the world decrease if the acting regions decrease their own emissions.
DNE21+ GCAM GEM-E3 IMACLIM IM
EU27 applies Road-Map
Emission reduction in EU27 [GtCO2] 1.8 7.0 3.4 4.5
Emission increase in Rest-of-World
[GtCO2]
0.1 0.3 0.7 0.3 −
Leakage Rate [%] 5.7 4.4 21.6 6.1 −
EU27&China apply carbon tax
Emission reduction in EU27&China
[GtCO2]
17.9 89.1 38.2 4
Emission increase in Rest-of-World
[GtCO2]
−0.1 2.1 3.1 −
Leakage Rate [%] −0.8 2.4 8.2 −REMIND changes from a slightly negative to amedium positive
leakage rate if China also acts. For WITCH, POLES and GEM-E3,
the carbon leakage rate decreases if China also strengthens its
mitigation ambition; and in case of GCAM the leakage rate even
becomes negative. The following fossil fuel market analysis
helps to reconcile this diversity.
Fig. 6 shows the reallocation of fossil fuels for the case
that EU alone implements the road map on top of the weak
policies. Some qualitative results are robust across models.
First, the EU generally uses less coal, oil and gas without CCS,
but some coal and gas is used in combination with CCS. The
reduction of oil use in the EU is subject to high leakage in five
models (WITCH, POLES, MESSAGE, MERGE-ETL and
GEM-E3). Significant positive coal leakage is found in three
cases (WorldScan2, MERGE-ETL and IMACLIM), whereas the
intra-European reallocation of coal towards CCS use is found
in five models. Also, some fossil fuels leak into CCS plants
outside the EU, if the carbon prices in other regions are
sufficiently high (IMACLIM).
In addition to the general results, it is useful to take a
detailed look into somemodels to explain the range of leakage
rates. The carbon leakage in WITCH is mainly generated by an
oil leakage rate of 53%. REMIND assumes high gas use in the
baseline in the EU, which leads to a relatively strong reduction
compared with coal. This reduced gas consumption is subject
to a leakage rate of nearly 50%. The higher gas supply helps to
substitute coal in the rest of the world and therefore the
reduction of coal use outside the EU is even higher than in the
EU itself. Qualitatively the same effect is found in POLES, but
here the fossil fuel substitution effect outside the EU is not large
enough to result in negative carbon leakage. In MESSAGE, the
EU reduces oil and gas use significantly, and that partially leaks
to other countries. This again leads to a substitution effect with
coal, which implies negative carbon leakage. However, the
intra-EU reallocation of gas towards applications with CCS is
even larger than the international gas leakage effect.
MERGE-ETL assumes high coal use in the baseline in the EU
due to globally scarce hydro-carbon availability. Therefore, the
EU mainly reduces the use of coal and that is subject to a
leakage rate of 50%. The oil leakage rate in MERGE-ETL even
exceeds 100%. The inter-fuel substitution caused by increasing
gas consumption in the EU can lead to a reverse leakage in theworld compared with reference policy case. The leakage rate is the ratio o
cting regions. A negative leakage rate implies that the emissions in the rest o
AGE MERGE-ETL MESSAGE POLES REMIND WITCH WorldScan2
4.6 5.0 3.7 4.6 3.1 11.3 2.6
0.2 2.3 −0.1 0.4 0.1 1.3 0.5
3.6 46.5 −3.2 7.8 −1.1 11.9 20.5
9.8 76.6 85.8 57.0 86.2
0.3 47.8 1.1 4.8 6.2
0.6 62.3 1.3 8.4 7.1f
f
Fig. 6. Changes of cumulative use of fossil energy carriers 2010–30 in EU27 and Rest of World compared with baseline, when EU27 applies the Road Map. Hatched
bars indicate fossil fuel use in combination with CCS. Bars without hatches indicate fossil fuel use without CCS.
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the EU, but here the effect is not strong enough to imply a
negative carbon leakage rate, as it does in REMIND and
MESSAGE. The 22% carbon leakage rate computed with
GEM-E3 is made up of different sectoral leakage rates. The
highest sectoral leakage rates in 2030 occur for the energy
conversion sector (31%) and energy intensive industries (19%).
The service sector experiences a negative carbon leakage rate
of −17% [27]. Finally, the models POLES, IMAGE, IMACLIM,
GCAM, and DNE-21 generally show small international fossil
fuel leakage.
The situation is different if we look at the scenario in
which the EU and China apply the “uniform 450 ppm-e
carbon tax”. Fig. 7 shows the effects on the fossil fuel
markets for eight models in the same format as the
previous figure. The most robust finding across models is
that China and the EU reduce coal consumption. This is
mainly due to commonly assumed high coal baselines in
China. However, only two models show notable leakage of
coal (REMIND, MERGE-ETL), but four models show the
switch towards coal with CCS (WITCH, POLES, IMACLIM,
GEM-E3). As in the previous case, the international coal
market is relatively unresponsive even with the large coal
reduction in China (see Figure S4 for price effects). The
change in oil use is ambiguous. EU and China increase oil
consumption in two models (REMIND, GCAM), though the
magnitude is rather small. Only three models show the oil
leakage effect at a notable scale (WITCH, MERGE-ETL,
GEM-E3). The reallocation of gas use is even more
ambiguous. Only three models (POLES, GEM-E3,
IMACLIM) show the expected leakage for natural gas, butfour models show increasing gas consumption in the acting
regions and two models show reversed gas leakage
(REMIND, MERGE-ETL).
Again, we take a closer look into the diversity of model
results. MERGE-ETL and REMIND show normal coal and
reversed gas leakage. MERGE-ETL also shows considerable oil
leakage. Oil leakage is the only considerable effect in WITCH,
though coal and gas are also reduced. Again, themodels POLES,
IMAGE, GCAM, and IMACLIM show negligible fossil fuel
leakage, though total fossil fuel reduction is now larger than
in the case of EU acting alone. The reduction of the carbon
leakage rates reported in Table 3 is due to the relatively
stronger reduction of coal, which is less responsive to leakage
than oil and gas.
Comparing the two policy cases, models agree that
reductions of coal use are subject to relatively small leakage
effects. Coal (aswell as gas)may also be reallocated domestically
towards plants equipped with CCS and, thus, this share does
not leak to international markets. International oil markets are
more responsive than coal. International gas markets are also
responsive, but it is ambiguous whether gas consumption is
increased or decreased in the regions that implement more
ambitious emission mitigation. If the acting region (like the EU)
reduces gas consumption, other regions might use this gas as a
substitute for carbon-intensive coal. This cause–effect chain
reduces carbon leakage and can even result in negative carbon
leakage. But, if the other regions in turn use more coal to
substitute for the missing gas, the carbon leakage rate increases
again. A similar cascade of effects can happen, if the acting
regions reduce oil, which leaks to the rest of the world where it
helps to substitute coal.
Fig. 7. Changes of cumulative use of fossil energy carriers 2010–30 in EU27 + China and Rest of World compared with Reference Policy baseline, when EU27 and
China apply the CO2 tax of the 450 ppm-e case. Hatched bars indicate fossil fuel use in combination with CCS.
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Policies to limit CO2 emissions in the near-term and
stabilize climate change in the long-term will interfere with
global fossil fuel markets in the short- and the long-run. This
study explores a multi-model scenario ensemble to gain
insights into this interrelationship. Our analysis makes four
original contributions to the scientific literature relevant for
the assessment of climate change mitigation policies.
The first contribution is that we compare the short- and
long-term use of coal, oil and gas without and with climate
stabilization targets. We account for the use of CCS and we
compare the fossil fuel consumption with the corresponding
endowments. This quantification adds to the analysis highlighted
by the IPCC (SPM TAR WGIII) that did not differentiate coal, oil
and gas [4]. The main result is that to achieve a 450 ppm-CO2eq
target coal use over the 21st century has to decrease significantly
and more than half of the proven reserve is left underground.
Under the same scenario, oil and gas are onlymarginally affected
in the near-term, and total use exceeds conventional reserves
and non-conventional reserves in the case of oil. CCS applied in
combination with coal and gas can significantly relax the
constraint on fossil fuel use. This is in stark contrast with a
scenario without emission limitations where coal reserves may
be exhausted and non-conventional oil resources would be used
in the 21st century.
The second original contribution relates to discounted fossil
fuel revenues.We show that coal generates the smallest revenue,
even though it is—without emission limitations—the largest
source of CO2 emissions. Oil and gas have much higher marketprices and, consequently, their revenues are significantly higher.
Despite large price uncertainties reflected in the various models,
we find that climate change stabilization accelerates the secular
trendof decliningGDP shares of fossil fuel revenues.Modelswith
high fossil fuel prices, in particular oil, also see large reductions of
fossil fuel revenues, if climate change stabilization targets are
met because the quantity reduction is also combinedwith a price
reduction. Fossil fuel revenues can decrease by 50% due to
climate change stabilization.
The third contribution addresses the deviation from the
idealized approach of full ‘when’-flexibility. Starting from the
case with full ‘when’-flexibility we assess short- and long-term
impacts of pledges in the Copenhagen Accord on fossil fuel
markets. In the short-term fossil fuel markets revert back to the
pathway of a scenario without emission limitations. Coal is the
fossil fuel for which the quantity change is largest, but as the
price is low revenue effects are small. Though oil and gas use
increase less, the gain in revenues is larger than for coal, because
the prices are higher and also revert back to the baseline case. In
the longer-term, fossil fuel usewould need to decrease to comply
with the carbon budget. The short-term distortion with higher
coal use leads to strongly amplified reallocations over the rest of
the century, because higher near-term emissions from coal are
balanced with lower emissions from gas and oil as well as
reduced use of fossils with CCS. The initial distortion is amplified
even more if the energy sector suffers from a coal lock-in. This
amplification can lead to double or even triple as large long-term
fossil fuel re-allocation as compared to the initial distortion.
However, total fossil fuel revenues over the 21st century would
increase due to discounting because the short-term effect
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fuels, it is found that this is not necessarily the case for oil and gas,
but surely for coal. The amplification of market distortions and
the effect on fossil fuel revenues is novel and highly relevant for
the assessment of the timing of global emission pathways over
the 21st century.
The fourth contribution addresses the issue of carbon
leakage from early mover action. The period of weak action
might be bridged by additional action of early movers, like the
EU and China in the present study, in a world that is framed
by weak and fragmented mitigation policies. Carbon leakage
can potentially undermine the environmental effectiveness
of unilateral policies because other countries increase their
emissions. Our study is the first focusing on carbon leakage
via the energy channel using a broad suit of models with
detailed representation of the energy sector. Our results show a
large uncertainty around the carbon leakage rate, which can
exceed 50%, but negative values are also possible, dependingon
the model and the choice of countries that play the pioneering
role in climate change mitigation. We identify three main
factors contributing to the variation in leakage rates. First, the
baseline energy system development and the impact of early
mover action on domestic fossil energy use determine the
initial effect on international fossil energy markets. Generally,
coal and oil use are reduced, but gas demand can increase,
particularly if China moves early and substitutes coal with gas.
Also, reduced domestic coal use does not necessarily increase
international coal supply because of transportation costs to
international markets. However, coal and gas can also be used
in combination with CCS, which leads to lower emissions
without increasing global supply. Second, the responsiveness
of other countries to changes in fossil fuel supply differs for
coal, oil and gas. Reducing consumption of internationally
traded oil implies high leakage rates; the same does not hold
for coal because of high transportation costs and weak carbon
prices outside the pioneering countries. Third, changes in fossil
fuel prices induce substitution effects in reluctant countries. In
particular, increasing world supply of oil and gas can serve as a
substitute for coal in non-acting regions, which reduces the
overall carbon leakage and potentially causes negative carbon
leakage.
These findings on leakage rates are a novelty. In 2007
the IPCC stated that carbon leakage rates vary between 5 and
20% [5]. [17] confirms this range and highlights that the
competitiveness channel is more important than the energy
channel. Detailed energy sector representations used in our
analysis indicate a much larger uncertainty range. Negative
carbon leakage results from inter-fuel substitution in non-
acting countries due to changing fossil fuel prices. The cause–
effect chain is fundamentally different than the line of argu-
mentation treated in a series of papers recently published in
the American Economic Review. The trigger for negative
carbon leakage identified by [20–22] is based on the scarcity
of capital that leads to the abatement resource effect (AER). If
the abating country demands more of the fixed factor capital,
then the non-abating country reduces total economic activity
and therefore CO2 emissions. Our study explains negative
leakage by the combination of international fossil fuel market
reallocation and inter-fuel substitution rather than resting on
the assumption that capital is a fixed factor. The issue of capital
market reallocation is also treated in the paper by Curras et al.in this special issue, where international capital mobility is
identified as positive, though small trigger for carbon leakage
[28].
In summary, when examining the effects of climate
stabilization policies on fossil fuel markets, one has to consider
the fundamental differences of coal, oil and gas markets.
Comparing the two deviations from idealized policies to achieve
climate change stabilization shows that it is important to
achieve an early, comprehensive and ambitious agreement on
emission stabilization to reduce emissions from coal. If some
countries choose to move early to limit CO2 emissions, the issue
of carbon leakage arises, but the magnitude is highly uncertain
and even the direction is unclear because of inter-fuel substitu-
tion induced in non-acting countries.
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